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CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LABOR ORGANIZATION
GEORGE BENNETT*

The endeavors to establish a workable international organization, fol-

lowing the two World Wars, have focused attention on vital problems of
common concern. Simultaneously, problems of constitutional law in foreign
relations, especially the treaty-making power, have become of increasing
importance. The International Labor Organization, established as an
agency of the League of Nations in 1919, was joined by the United States
in 1934. It is now the agency of the United Nations which deals with the
international aspects of labor problems, and consists of 60 members.' The
purpose of the I. L. 0. is to "seek by international action to improve labor
conditions, raise living standards, and promote economic and social stability." 2 The fundamental principles, summarized in 1944 at the annual
General Conference, are that:

I. Labor is not a commodity.
2. Freedom of expression and of association are essential to sustained
progress.
3. Poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere.

4. The war against want requires to be carried out with unrelenting
vigor within each nation, and by continuous and concerted international effort in which the representatives of workers and employers, enjoying equal status with those of Governments, join
with them in free discussion and democratic decision with a view
to the promotion of the common welfare.
The United States has taken an active but not a controlling role in the
activities of the International Labor Organization. We have ratified six
(of which four are in force) of the 98 Conventions adopted by the
.L.O. up to the present time. The amended Constitution of the I.L.O. was
accepted by the United States in 1946, becoming effective in 1948. The
present Director-General, appointed by the Governing Body of the I.L.O.,
is Mr. David A. Morse, a former Under-Secretary of Labor of the United
States.
However, there has been strong opposition to the participation of the
ILL.B., LL.M. Attorney-adviser, Office of the Solicitor, Division of Int'l Labor
Affairs, Dep't of Labor, Washington, D. C. lie opinions expressed are those of the
author, and are not intended to reflect the views of the Dep't of Labor.
Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bul- Afghanistan,
garia, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland,
France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israeli,
Italy, Lebanon, Liberia( Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Siam, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria,
Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
2. DEP'T STArE PuB. No. 3323 at 81 (1948).
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United States in the International Labor Organization, and it has increased
since the acceptance of the amended Constitution imposing new duties on
such members as the United States. 3 If the critics have sound arguments
against our intIernational labor activity, the United States should take steps
to withdraw from the Organization; but if the criticism is unwarranted, the
program should be supported by government, labor, and management.
I
The first argument against the constitutionality of participation by the
United States is that labor matters are not a proper subject for international
action. The numerous references in the Constitution of the United States
to foreign affairs 4 are not all-inclusive nor self-explanatory; so that the development of constitutional law in this. as in other fields, has been by interpretation.
The proper subject-matter, or scope, of the treaty-making power is not
defined anywhere in the Constitution, and only general statements of the
nature of the power are to be found in Supreme Court decisions. It has
been said that, inasmuch as the power is granted in general terms, the
treaty-making power "was designed to include all those subjects, which, in
the ordinary intercourse of nations, had usually been made subjects of
negotiation. .

.

. "I

Similar assertions have been made in other Supreme

Court opinions.7 Still, no one claims that the power can apply to any
topic regardless of the result, for the Court has declared that:"
The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by those restraints which are found in that instrument
against the action of the government or its departments, or those
arising from the nature of the government itself and that of the States.
It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize what
the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the government or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of
the territory of the latter, without its consent.
Labor matters have long been the subject of international agreement,
without question of propriety, both between other nations and between
the United States and other countries. In 1882 and 1897, France and
Belgium concluded agreements to protect migratory workers. France and
Italy, in 1904, agreed to regulate migratory workers' pensions, workmen's
compensation for accidents, unemployment payments, protection of minors
in industry, and to publish annual reports on the application of laws relating to the work of women and children. From 1904 to 1913 there were
3.

DEP'T or LABOR, WORLD LABOR S-rANDARDS 6 (1949).

4. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, cl. 10, cl. 11, cl. 16, Art. I, § 10, cl. 1, cl. 3,
Art. ii, § 2. cl. 1, c. 2, Art. II, § 3, Art. II1, § 2,.cl. 1, Art. VI, cl. 2.
6. Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 538, 569 (U.S. 1840).
7. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890); In re Ross,.140 U.S. 453 (1891); Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U. S. 30 (1931).
8. Geofroy v. Riggs, supra note 7, at 267.
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numerous compacts, by various European nations, concerning accident insurance. Conferences on labor problems, attended by representatives from
many countries, were held in Berne, Switzerland, in 1906 and 1913;9 and
in 1919 the International Labor Organization was established.
Treaties made by the United States concerning labor problems include
workmen's compensation' 0 and the work of travelling salesmen,'' as well
as a variety of other matters which can be considered as labor topics.12
Around 1800, treaties with France'" and with Great Britain' 4 regulated
the rights of fishermen in certain geographical areas. Further, international
agreements have covered a wide range in the protection of industrial property and of inventions, patents, trade-marks, designs and industrial methods,
and in the regulation of technical details in international wireless telegraphy.
In carryiig out the purpose of setting labor standards on an international plane, past General Conferences of the I. L. 0. have dealt with such

labor matters as:

hours of work in industry, road transport, commerce, of-

fices, and coal mines; night work for women and young people; minimum
age in industry and agriculture; the right of association in agriculture, and
freedom of association in general; workmen's compensation: forced labor;
old-age insurance in industry and agriculture; recruiting of indigenous workers; migration for employment; labor inspections; and conditions of work
at sea.
9. 2 SHOTWELL, ORiGINS OF TILE I~rERNAfrONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION 10-12
(1934).
10. Treaty with Italy, 1871, § 3, as amended in 1913; Treaty with Servia, 1881,
Art. XI; Treaty with Norway, 1928, Art. II; Treaty with Liberia, 1938, Art. TI.
11. Treaty with Guatemala, 1918; Treaty with Uruguay, 1918; Treaty with Panama,
1919; Treaty with El Salvador, 1919; Treaty with Paraguay, 1919; Treaty with Venezuela,
1919; Treaty with Peru, 1923.
12. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation with Mexico, 1831, Art. VII ("All
merchants . . . and other citizens of the United States of America shall have full liberty
in the United Mexican States to direct . . . their own affairs . . . nor shall they be

obliged to employ for the aforesaid purposes any other persons than those employed by
Mexicans, nor to pay them higher salaries or remuneration than such as are in like cases
paid by Mexicans .... "), Art. X (exemption from military service for the other nation);
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Argentina, 1853, Art. X (exemption
from military or naval service); Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Italy, 1871,
Art. III (exemption from military and naval service); Treaty of Trade, Consuls, and Emigration with China, 1868, Art. VIII (in construction of railroads and telegraphic installations in China, China will secure suitable engineers designated by the United States and
will protect them and their property and pay a reasonable compensation for their services);
Treaty of Immigration with China, 1880, Art. II, Art. III (protection of Chinese laborers
in the United States, according to the "most favored nation" clause); Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan, 1858, Art. X (Japan has the right to hire, in the
United States, naval and military men, artisans of all kinds, and mariners to enter into
its service); Tariff Convention with Japan, 1866, Art. X (Japanese subjects may be employed in any capacity aboard vessels of any nation having a treaty with Japan).
13. Treaty of Amity and Commerce with France, 1778, Art. IX (fishing rights of
subjects of France and the United States in the territory of each nation), Art. X (right
of subjects of France to fish on the Newfouidland banks).
14. Definitive Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, 1783, Art. Ill (subjects of the
United States were given fishing rights on the Grand Banks and all other Newfoundland
banks, and right to cure and dry fish in unsettled bays of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands,
and Labrador); Convention Respecting Fisheries, Boundary, and Restoration of Slaves
with Great Britaii, 1818, Art. I.
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Therefore, it can be said that labor matters have been the subject of
international agreement for a long time, and are properly the subject of
treaties. In obedience to the Constitution, labor problems should be regarded the same as all other topics of the treaty power-including migratory
birds. 15 The test of the scope of the treaty-making power is whether the
effective operation of the Federal or State Governments would be impeded
or destroyed,10 not the nature of the subject-matter of the agreement.
A treaty may be self-operative or executory, and the criterion for determining which it is does not depend on the subject-matter. Rather, reference
must be had to the precise language of each treaty. Ratification of a selfoperative treaty causes the happening of what is decreed by the words, so
that it is effective as law without other action; but if the terms of the treat),
alone do not bring about the conditions to which the parties agreed, then
implementing legislation is necessary for the treaty to become effective as
law. 17

By express provision of the Constitution; a treaty made under the
authority of the United States, when executed, becomes part of the supreme
law of the land' on an equal footing with an act of Congress. Accordingly,
if a statutory law of the United States is in conflict with a self-operative
treaty, the one later in time is prior in right. 19 The clear and explicit provisions of a constitutional act of Congress must be upheld, even though
contravening an express stipulation of a prior treaty, whether it is selfoperative or executory and implemented by an act of Congress. Thus,
should a treaty supersede a statute of the United States, Congress can in
turn enact a law to override the treaty. And, of course, a valid treaty or
an act of Congress is superior to State law. 20 Again, in obedience to the
Constitution, labor treaties, including those which in the I.L.O. procedure
are called "Conventions," should be treated the same as treaties concerning
other subjects.
Finally, the grant of the treaty'making power 21 has been construed,
regardless of the subject-matter, to give to the President the sole power for
the negotiation of treaties; even though a reasonable interpretation would
be that the President must act with the advice and guidance of the Senate.
Consent to ratification is now the only province of the Senate; but research
indicates that there have been numerous instances in which the President
has made an agreement with a foreign nation without ever obtaining an
15. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
16. Geofroy v. Riggs, supra note 7.
17. 5 IIAcKwORTii, DIcEST 177-185 (1943); Aixr. J. INr'L L., SuPP. PT. III, 787-799

(1935).

18. U. S. CONST. Art. VI, el. 2.

19. Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914); Homer v. United States, 143
U.S. 570 (1892); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888); United States v. LariViere,
108 U.S. 491 (1887).
20. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879); Ware v. lylton, 3 Dall. 199
(U.S. 1796).
21. U. S. CoNsT. Art. II, § 2, ci.2.
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affirmative vote of the Senate. The President may choose to consider the
compact as an executive agreement, and call for its adoption by a joint resolution of Congress which requires only a majority of both the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
The term "resolution" is used only once in the Constitution, 22 and in
modem legislative practice there are three types. A simple resolution deals
with matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of either the House or the
Senate; while concurrent resolutions are used for non-legislative action by
both bodies. A joint resolution has been habitually made a method of
legislation, having the force and effect of law, and following a procedure
"identical with that on bills, with the exception of joint resolutions pro3
posing amendments to the Constitution."2
In the international relations of the United States, a joint resolution
has occasionally been used with an executive agreement. For example, a
treaty was made with Texas for its annexation to the Union, but upon the
failure of the Senate to ratify the treaty the same result was achieved by a
joint resolution of Congress and a Proclamation by the President. At other
times a joint resolution was used without ratification by the Senate. The
United States joined the International Labor Organization by that method,
and accepted the amended I.L.O. Constitution in the same way. The question is, then, whether this country is bound to the I.L.O.
The Supreme Court has recognized that an international obligation
can be created without a two-thirds vote of the Senate. In the Altman
case,24 Congressional action empowering the President to make reciprocal
tax arrangements was held to be proper, and "while it may be true that this
commercial agreement ...was not a treaty possessing the dignity of one
requiring ratification by the Senate of the United States, it was an international compact"'2 5 which had a binding effect on the nations involved.
That principle was reiterated in the Belmont case, 28 with the additional
declaration that State laws do not affect the external powers of the United
States. Thus an executive agreement by the President, without action by
the Senate or by any other body, became part of the supreme law. And, in
the Curtiss-Vright case 27 the Court stated that the power of the Chief
Executive over foreign affairs cannot be measured by the same standards as
are applicable to internal matters, since the origins of the external and domestic powers were different. On that basis the contention was rejected
that a joint resolution of Congress had unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the President. The joint resolution required a finding by
the Chief Executive that a Presidential Proclamation, forbidding the sale
22. U.S. CoNsr. Art. 1, § 7, cl.
3.
23. ENACTMENT OF A LAw 290 et seq. (U.S. Gov't Printing Off. 1907); see 4
IND'S PRECEDENTS 290 et seq. (U.S. Gov't Printing Off. 1907).
24. Altman v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912).

25. Id. at 601.

26. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
27. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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of arms in this country to certain nations engaged in war, would aid in
establishing peace. From those cases it appears certain that the President
can bind the United States by an executive agreement, without the formality
2
of ratification by the Senate.
The limitation on the power of Congress in international affairs depends upon Article I of the Constitution. There are given the powers to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, to define and punish piracies and
felonies on the high seas and offenses against the law of nations, and to
make all laws necessary and proper to carry out the enumerated powers.29
Still, "It is not indispensable to the existence of any power claimed for the
Federal Government that it can be found specified in the words of the Constitution, or clearly and directly traceable to some one of the specified
powers. Its existence may be deduced fairly from more than one of the
substantive powers expressly defined, or from them all combined. ' '3 0 Even
earlier the statement was made that the "necessary and proper" clause did
not restrict the power to indispensably necessary, but rather to reasonably
necessary.a'
Therefore, it seems clear that Congress may act, by bill or resolution,
in accordance with the enumerated powers supplemented by a reasonably
"necessary and proper" power. The President, inasmuch as he has the
leadership in international affairs, can make an agreement, which would
be as binding as a treaty ratified by the Senate, if Congress concurs by a
joint resolution. This presupposes, of course, that Congress is acting within
the scope of the powers delegated to it by Article I of the Constitution.
II
The second argument against participation by the United States 'in
the
International Labor Organization is that it is an attempt-to accomplish
through international action what cannot constitutionally be accomplished
at the national level. To answer that, one must look at the Constitution
of the I.L.O. to determine what are the obligations imposed' on members
of the Organization.
An interesting feature of the I.L.O. is that it does not represent governments alone, but rather combines government, labor, and management.
At the General Conferences, held annually, each member is authorized to
send four voting representatives, two from government, one from labor, and
one from management. The Conferences meet for the purpose of setting
labor standards on an international plane, drafting Conventions and Recommendations which may be adopted by a two-thirds vote of the delegates
casting ballots..3 2 The delegates vote independently rather than in a bloc.32 a
28. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS
29. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, ci. 3, cl.10, c. 16.
30. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 534 (U.S. 1870).
31. United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358 (U.S. 1805).
32. I.L.O. CONST. Art. XIX, § 2.
32a. I.L.O. CONST. Art. IV, § 1.

TODAY

103-106 (1947).

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Upon adoption by a General Conference, a Convention or a Recommendation does not become binding upon the members as a group, or even
upon those members who voted in favor of its adoption. There are procedural obligations, depending upon the status of the members. Membership in the I.L.O. falls into one of two classes, "unitary States" or "federal
States." The "federal States" are those, such as the United States, Canada,
Australia, and Switzerland, of which the political sub-divisions are Federal
and State, provincial or cantonal units. Those members operating under
a single governmental mechanism are "unitary States."
Once a Convention has been adopted, two separate and independent
steps must be considered by all unitary States. Ratification of the Convention must be sought, and implementing legislation, when necessary, must
be requested. For an adopted Recommendation, only one step need be
considered, that of seeking implementing legislation unless the law already
complies with its terms. 33 A Convention which has been ratified becomes
a treaty and a binding contract between nations acting at the international
level; while unratified Conventions and Recommendations, not being
treaties, have no binding effect upon the members.
There is a different procedural obligation imposed upon the federal
States, which are composed of political sub-divisions exercising sovereignty
in prescribed areas. Federal States are subject to limitations in the enactment of legislation to give effect to labor treaties, so that they are not sub34
ject to an absolute duty to seek ratification of all adopted Conventions.
The United States must offer some Conventions to the competent authority
for ratification, but that step need not be undertaken with other Conventions. However, in any case implementing legislation must be sought from
the competent authority, unless the ratified Convention as a treaty is selfoperative, or unless the law already conforms to its terms. For a Recommendation, the obligation of a federal State is the same as that of a unitary
State, to seek implementing legislation unless its terms have been fulfilled
Implementing legislation may be at the Federal or at the State level, depending on the nature of the subject-matter of the Convention or the Recommendation.
Inasmuch as a federal State does not have an absolute duty to seek
ratification of all Conventions, the important problem is to determine when
it must do so. Under the original I.L.O. Constitution, it was provided
that :35
In the case of a federal State, the power of which to enter into conventions on labour matters is subject to limitations, it shall be in the
discretion of that Government to treat a draft convention to which
such limitations apply as a recommendation only, and the provisions
33. I.L.O. CoNST. Art. XIX, §§ 5, 6.
34. I.L.O. CONST. Art. XIX, § 7.
35. I.L.O. CoNsr. Art. XIX, § 9.
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of this article with respect to recommendations shall apply in such
case.
In practice, the United States treated Conventions merely as Recommendations, in most instances. On what basis? Was the power of the United
States to enter into labor treaties subject to limitations? I think not. The
power to enter into labor treaties is the same as the power to enter into
any other kind of treaty. I admit that the right is not absolute, but the
rule granting discretion to federal States was intended to apply only to the
particular Conventions which would be subject to limitations. I have seen
no Conventions of the I.L.O. which approached the prescribed limitations."S
Since it was intended that the discretion rule apply only to those Conventions upon which there was a limitation, 37 under the original I.L.O.
Constitution the United States should have treated Conventions as Conventions, with the same obligations as unitary States. In 1919, perhaps labor
matters were not considered appropriate for Federal action, and possibly on
that ground it was felt that there was a limitation on the power to enter
into labor treaties. That is based on a domestic test, as though the Convention were a piece of domestic legislation. Inasmuch as the power to
enter into labor Conventions obviously depends upon the treaty power, I
do not think the domestic test was the proper one. It has been shown that
labor matters were dealt with, prior to 1919, under the treaty power. And,
using a domestic test, even though in 1919 constitutional lawyers may have
believed that labor matters were not proper subjects for action by the Federal Government, certainly that attitude had changed at some time before
1946. Witness the Federal labor laws of the 1930 decade. Thus, under
the old I.L.O. Constitution, the United States was bound to seek ratification of adopted Conventions, having the same obligation as the unitary
States. But that is not the way it was handled. In fact, the Joint Resolution which originally authorized the President to accept membership in the
I.L.O. stated that:38
... special provision has been made in the constitution of the International Labor Organization, by which membership of the United
States would not impose or be deemed to impose any obligation or
agreement upon the United States to accept the proposals of that
body as involving anything more than recommendations for its consideration ...
The amendment to the I.L.O. Constitution, with respect to Conventions, was intended to increase the obligation of the federal States. I contend that the obligation of the United States is now less thin before the
amendment, or more properly, than what it should have been before the
change. Article XIX, § 7(a) of the amended Constitution provides that:
36. See note 8 sura.
37. 1.L.O. REP. II (1),
SHOTWELL,

38.

CONSTITUTIONAL

op. cit. suira note 9, at 362-363.
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40-43, 178-180 (1946);

LXIX-LXX (1935).
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• . * in respect of Conventions . .. which the federal Government regards as appropriate under its constitutional system for federal action,
the obligation of the federal State shall be the same as those of Members which are not federal States.
Section 7(b) states that:
.

in respect of Conventions ...

which the federal Government re-

gards as appropriate under its constitutional system, in whole or in
part. for action by the constituent States

.

. . rather than for federal

action, the federal Government shall make, in accordance with its
Constitution and the Constitutions of the States ... effective arrangements for the reference of such Conventions . . . to the appropriate
federal, State ... authorities for the enactment of legislation or other

action.
There is no harmony in the possible interpretations of the meaning of
the federal State obligation under that Article. One is that the treaty-making power is included in the "constitutional system" of the United States,
and "appropriate" means "within the power." The treaty-making power is
to be included in the constitutional test necessary to determine the appropriateness of the Federal or State action. On the position that labor matters
can be the subject of treaties, all I.L.O. Conventions will fall under § 7(a),
and ratification will have to be attempted. There is, of course, the argument that labor matters are not a proper subject of treaties, according to
which ratification of a Convention should never be attempted.
Another possibility is that the treaty power is not read into the "constitutional system" of § 7. A Convention is to be considered as though it
were domestic legislation, and the power of the State and Federal governments is to be analyzed on the basis of our constitutional law as it applies
to domestic matters. If the Federal Government has the constitutional
power to deal with all aspects of the subject-matter of a Convention, § 7(a)
applies, so that ratification of the Convention should be attempted. This
line of thought reads the word "completely" into § 7(a). Then, if the
Federal Government can deal with part of the subject-matter, and part. falls
within the power of the States, the Convention falls within § 7(b) and
ratification would not be required, but only an attempt to pass implementing legislation at the Federal or the State level or at both levels.
A different line of reasoning is used to claim that ratification depends
on the level at which implementation is to be sought. If implementation
can be accomplished constitutionally, on the test of domestic legislation, at
either the Federal or the State level, the choice of the authority to be exercised will decide whether ratification is attempted. Ratification will be
sought for implementation at the Federal level, but not otherwise. This
would leave a wide range of discretion to the Federal Government, although
it is not as broad as practice indicated it was under the old I.L.O. Constitution.
Still another contention is that Art. XIX means that only those portions
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of a Convention: which are within the Federal power, using a domestic test,
shall be offered to the Senate of the United States for advice to ratification.
Other parts of the Convention would be handled under § 7(b) of Art. XIX.
Finally, one interpretation of § 7 is that the word "exclusively" should
be read into the scope of the Federal power necessary to bring a Convention within the ratification procedure. If the matter, considered as domestic
legislation, lies exclusively within the power of the Federal Government,
then and only then must ratification be sought. The reason is that the
words of § 7(b) become inconsistent with the terms of § 7(a) unless the
"exclusive" test is applied to § 7(a). Section 7(b) provides that if the
subject-matter is appropriate, in whole or in part, for action by the States,
ratification is not requisite and only implementation need be attempted;
so when the Federal Government can act in part, and the States can act
in part, the problem falls under § 7(b). Obviously, if the Federal Government is the only agency with the power to act on the matter of a Convention, the problem is under § 7(a); and if the States only have the power to
act, again it is a problem under § 7(b). The difference between this view
and the one which reads "completely" into § 7(a) is that, by making the
Federal power exclusive, a Convention would come within § 7(b) if the
States can act in part even though the Federal Government could act on
the whole matter. According to this theory, the power of the Federal Government to deal with the entire subject of a Convention would be an important factor in determining the level at which implementation should be
sought.
Therefore, one thing appears clear to me: the amended I.L.O. Constitution leaves no room for a policy determination based upon expediency
or politics in defining the action necessary to be taken with a Convention.
No answer can be given in advance on the steps to be taken, for each Convention must be individually regarded to determine the obligation of' the
United States. The "exclusive" view seems the most logical to me, appearing to be most consistent with the spirit of the federal State obligation. For
it is the power to give effect to labor treaties which controls the obligation
of a federal State. 39 If that power is limited, no ratification is necessary.
The power of the Federal Government is limited, in giving effect to a Convention, whenever it is not the exclusive authority in the field. The determination of "appropriateness" is a determination of power, based upon
a domestic finding. What makes the "exclusive" test more convincing
than the others is the apparent disparity between § 7(a) and § 7(b) upon
applying the other interpretations.
I do not think that membership in the I.L.O. has extended or in any
way changed the treaty-making process of the United States. The nature
of the subject-matter certainly is within the scope of the foreign relations
of the United States, and it appears obvious that the full treaty powers are
39. T.L.O.

REP. II (1),

CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS

184 (1946).
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not being used in handling I.L.O. subjects. Only when the topic of a
Convention is regarded as appropriate, by a domestic test, for Federal action,
is ratification sought. There is no such limitation on our treaty-making
power. Doubtless a treaty can be made and ratified even though the States
would be competent to act in the absence of the treaty. Our obligation
tinder the I.L.O. Constitution is less than that; and indeed the United
States is bound less than it might have been, since the treaty-making power
is broader than our commitments under the I.L.O. The Organization's
Constitution binds us only to seek ratification of those Conventions which
are appropriate for federal action in accordance with the Constitution of
the United States. Thus, there is no basis for the fear that something is
being done internationally which cannot be constitutionally accomplished
nationally.
If labor matters are a proper subject for international agreement, and
it seems apparent that they are, and if the I.L.O. is an effective organization
in the international field, and I think that it is, the United States must
proceed to fulfill its international labor obligations in order to assure the
success of the program. Participation by the United States in the activities
of the I.L.O. could be facilitated, (and this is true of all our international
activity), by amending the Constitution of the United States to provide
an equal role for the House of Representatives in international affairs. There
has been repeated use of a device other than the two-thirds vote of the
Senate, for ratification of executive agreements; and implementing legislation is required for most treaties, which ordinarily are not self-operative.
Since both Houses of Congress must pass the legislation, it appears logical
that both should give consent to ratification of the treaty, by a majority of
each House.
Government, management, and labor have cooperated in the activities
of the International Labor Organization to an appreciable degree in the
past, and we can look forward to continued cooperation in the future. That
diverse interests are represented in the forum of the Organization is natural
and should be encouraged. All sides have an interest in what is happening
there, and all of us have a real stake in its activities. Let us work together
to insure a vital and vigorous International Labor Organization-it can be
an important step in the achievement of a democratic and peaceful world.

